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The United States patent system has increasingly been faced with complications presented by a type of 
non-practicing entity known as ‗patent trolls‘—patent owner entities that do not actively innovate, 
develop or manufacture patented material but instead seek to profit from patent ownership through 
licensing agreements and litigation.  This article explores arguments on both sides of the non-practicing 
entity debate and evaluates perceptions of this activity as both an accessible secondary commodities 
market and a litigation-based business model.   
 
Given the complexity and ever-evolving nature of various patent law claims, this article also examines the 
difficulties faced by legislators in attempting to solve the patent troll problem.  Recent judicial activity 
related to patent law allowing for individually-focused, closely tailored analysis is examined with an 
evaluation of four recent court decisions and resulting changes to the patent system.  These specific 
limitations placed upon the patent system are resulting in a slow but targeted effort at diminishing the 
power and attractiveness of patent trolling.  
 
 
 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL‘Y, Vol. 12, No. 4, Fall 2011 
 
1 
DIMINISHING THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF TROLLING:  
THE IMPACTS OF RECENT JUDICIAL ACTIVITY ON NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES 
 
By Holly Forsberg 
Volume XII – Fall 2011  
 
 
Has the U.S. patent system been transformed from a system rewarding innovation with 
exclusive rights to a mechanism providing protection for entities that profit from attacking 
development?  Viewed in an extreme light, possibly yes.  Initially granted with the creation of 
the U.S. Constitution, individual patent rights and claims have been subject to significant 
transformation in recent years.  With the ever-increasing advancements in technology and 
complexity of intellectual property, new issues continue to arise surrounding the enforcement of 
patent rights.  Within the last decade, there have been significant developments in the number 
and sophistication of non-practicing entities (sometimes known as ‗patent trolls‘). These entities 
typically do not practice their patents, but rather, base patent ownership on collecting licensing 
fees or pursuing litigation based on infringement.   
This note will examine the complex issues associated with non-practicing entities and 
how legislative and judicial responses have been increasingly sought in recent years.  Part I will 
introduce the reader to the patent troll debate and offer support both for and against the practice, 
demonstrating that there are strong, viable arguments for both sides of the issue.  Part II will go 
into more detail describing the existence of non-practicing entities, a corresponding secondary 
commodities market and a profit-making business model that often accompanies the practice.  
An examination of recent federal circuit and Supreme Court decisions will demonstrate how 
judicially imposed limitations may affect the ability of non-practicing entities or patent trolls to 
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thrive on infringement suits.  Part III will offer a detailed discussion of recent judicial decisions 
that carry with them implications for the patent system as a whole as well as the ability of non-
practicing entities to profit from their business models.   
 
I.  Patent Law and the Non-Practicing Entity Problem 
 
 The Constitution states: ―the Congress shall have power . . . to promote the Progress of . . 
. useful Arts, by securing for limited times to . . . inventors the exclusive right to their . . . 
discoveries.‖1  Though the U.S. patent system has become a much more complex collection of 
laws and regulations since the creation of the Constitution, this explicit constitutional grant 
comprises the basis of today‘s system.  In practical terms, the promise offered by the 
Constitution has created a long-standing tradition and expectation in the United States that 
creation, innovation and development will be protected and promoted.   The Patent Act of 1790 
(most recently revised in 1952), provided a source of legislative power that backed up this 
constitutional promise and expectation of protection, but modern and rapid advancements in 
technology continue to present new issues to the current patent system.2  
 In particular, one problem that has arisen is the creation of a business model where 
companies acquire patents or patent rights in order to generate revenue through patent licensing 
agreements or litigation.3  Widely known as non-practicing entities (NPEs), these entities use 
patents simply as a means to an end of revenue generation as opposed to legally granted tools of 
                                                        
1 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 ARTHUR MILLER & MICHAEL DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHT 8-9 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
3 Ghyo Sun Park & Seong Don Hwang, The Rise of the NPE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://www.managingip.com/Article/2740039/The-rise-of-the-NPE.html. 
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innovation.4  Some practitioners refer to these entities as ‗patent trolls‘, intending to convey a 
strong negative association with the practice.5  The use of this derogatory title has been the 
subject of much debate, as many see a business model approach to patent ownership as a way to 
create a secondary commodities market that allows for greater opportunity and liquidity for small 
start-up companies with limited funding.6  Yet when practiced opportunistically, NPE patent-
holders have the ability to legally attack entities engaging in the innovation and development of 
new products via lawsuits and injunctions based on infringement claims.   
Whether viewed as opportunistic entities that are stalling innovation or as businesses that 
are creating market opportunities and simply enforcing legitimate patent claims, the impact NPE 
activity allowed under the patent system is an issue that is often debated as a part of patent 
reform.7  Since 2007, patent reform has been debated in Congress and drafted patent reform acts 
have been presented every year since 2008.8  After years of proposals, speculation and drafts, the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) was passed by Congress and signed by President 
Barack Obama in September 2011.9  The passage of the AIA warrants a brief overview of the 
change that may most affect the ability of NPEs to operate effectively: new limitations on 
joinder.10  Under the AIA, parties may only be joined as defendants if both ―(1) the right to relief 
                                                        
4 Id. 
5 TJ Chiang, What is a troll patent and why are they bad?, PATENTLYO (Mar. 6, 2009), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/what-is-a-troll-patent-and-why-are-they-bad.html. 
6 Martin Lueck, Stacie Oberts & Kimberly G. Miller, “Patent Troll”: A Self-Serving Label That Should Be 
Abandoned, ROBERTS, KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI, LLP (Sept. 28, 2005), 
http://www.rkmc.com/Patent_Troll_A_Self-Serving_Label_that_Should_be_Abandoned.htm. 
7 Jennifer Martinez, Tech Investors Call for Patent Reform, POLITICO (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/45295.html. 
8 Rick Weiss, Tackling the Challenge of Patent Reform, SCIENCE PROGRESS (Jan. 12, 2009), 
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/01/tackling-the-challenge-of-patent-reform/. 
9 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
10 This short caveat is meant to provide background to the reader as to very recent changes to patent law most 
affecting non-practicing entities.  Since this legislation has been so recently enacted, it would be difficult to 
complete a full analysis as to how the changes will affect the patent system in practice.  The focus of the remainder 
of this note will be on judicial activity related to the activities of NPEs and thus, mention of the AIA is primarily for 
the reader to gain an understanding of the type of reform that has been enacted after years of debate. 
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is asserted against the parties jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out 
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences relating to making, 
using, importing into the United States, offering for sale, or selling of the same accused product 
or process; and (2) questions of fact are common to all defendants or counterclaim defendants 
will arise in the action.‖11  With the implementation of this section, a plaintiff may no longer join 
alleged infringers in the same action simply based on the fact that they are accused to have 
infringed on the same patent.  This change has been praised by many, with some noting that 
under the prior joinder rules, ―with an almost-too-casual ease, any patent owner could bring 
together virtually any disparate group of patent infringement defendants based upon nothing 
more than an allegation that each has infringed.‖12  This action disadvantages NPEs who have 
typically joined several defendants in actions on the same patent, as they will now be forced to 
pursue action separately on each claim unless there are both questions of fact common to all 
defendants and the right to relief is asserted jointly, severally, or arising out of the same action, 
eliminating a substantial amount of economic efficiency.13  Though this may be a step in the 
right direction, the full effects of the AIA remain to be seen and other changes may, in fact, end 
up hurting small, independent inventors and helping larger, more asset-rich corporations.14 
While the implementation of the AIA is a large legislative step in the right direction, 
there are still a number of unanswered questions with the current patent system.  Specifically 
related to NPEs, many seek clarification on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office‘s (USPTO) 
position regarding the practice.15  Should this activity be allowed?  How much harm are NPEs 
                                                        
11 35 U.S.C.A. § 299(a) (2011). 
12 Charles Gorenstein, America Invents Act Exercises “Con-Troll” Over Patent Litigation, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 19, 
2011), http://ipwatchdog.com/2011/09/19/con-troll-over-patent-litigation/id=19279/. 
13 Id. 
14 See infra, note 51. 
15 See Weiss, supra note 8. 
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causing to the patent system as a whole?  Numerous scholars and practitioners have proffered 
legitimate arguments on both sides of the debate and Parts I (a) and (b) below contain common 
arguments presented by each side.16 
 
a. NPEs Are Abusing The Current Patent System 
 
Generally, individuals who believe that NPEs are abusing the current system view these 
entities as trolls seeking to profit primarily from legal action (whether it be through litigation, 
out-of-court settlements or licensing agreements).17 Often, rather than using the term ‗non-
practicing entity‘, the term ‗patent troll‘ is used to describe the activities of those that do not 
―practice‖ their patents.18  However, it is overly broad to group all NPEs that do not actively 
practice their patents together into one innovation-thwarting category of patent trolls.  This is 
because the term NPE can also be used to describe entities that choose to not actively practice 
their patents for legitimate, non-litigation-based reasons, such as research and development in 
university settings and other research institutions, as well as small start-up companies that are 
financially unable to practice their patents through development and production.19   
These exceptions aside, however, patent trolls are generally viewed as entities that force 
other innovative, enterprising companies into hostage-like situations resulting in the unsavory 
choice between expensive litigation, costly settlements and potentially disproportionate licensing 
                                                        
16 Compare Daniel McCurdy, Patent Trolls Erode the Foundation of the U.S. Patent System, SCIENCE PROGRESS 
(Jan. 12, 2009),  
http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/01/patent-trolls-erode-patent-system/ (arguing that NPEs are abusing the 
patent system) with Lueck et al.,, supra note 6, (arguing that NPEs are simply enforcing legally-granted rights).   
17 Timothy Delaney, When It Comes To Patent Trolls, Decks Stacked Against Manufacturers, NAT‘L L.J. (June 14, 
2011), available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202497040838&slreturn=1. 
18  Gene Quinn, In Search of a Definition for the Term “Patent Troll”, IPWATCHDOG (July 18, 2010), 
http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/07/18/definition-patent-troll/id=11700/. 
19 Id. 
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fees.20  It is argued that action pursued by such trolls is often frivolous.21  As one practitioner 
explained to Congress, trolls don‘t even need to litigate to be victorious, ―This unpredictable 
legal environment has encouraged legitimate companies threatened by patent trolls to pay large 
settlements as trial nears rather than risking . . . their entire business.‖22  While the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure Rule 11(b)(1) requires that a suit ―is not being presented for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation‖ 
and Rule 11(b)(2) states that: ―claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument,‖ Rule 11 sanctions are, historically, rarely brought 
up in these cases.23   
However, courts may slowly be starting to give Rule 11 claims more credence and it is 
possible that if more Rule 11 claims were enforced, a legitimate concern would exist for those 
seeking to profit from infringement litigation.24  By giving more serious consideration to Rule 11 
claims, courts would be recognizing the importance of legitimate legal claims based on adequate 
investigation.  In the past, trolls have used infringement claims to intimidate the other party into 
a settlement or licensing arrangement. However, an increased focus and awareness of Rule 11 
claims means that more research would be required on the part of the troll to ensure that they do, 
                                                        
20 See generally Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159 (2006); Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using 
Apportionment to Rein in the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (describing 
royalty awards as ‗arbitrary‘ and ‗punitive‘). 
21 Allan Sternstein, Baseless Trademark Suits are Troublesome for Companies, INSIDE COUNSEL (July 13, 2010), 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2010/07/13/baseless-trademark-suits-are-troublesome-for-companies.  
22 Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop., 
Before the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 54 (2003) (quoting David M. Simon of Intel Corporation), 
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju88545.000/hju88545_0.htm [hereinafter Patent 
Quality Improvement Hearing]. 
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 11; See Gene Quinn, Rule 11 Sanctions + Exceptional Case = Bad Day for Patent Troll, 
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 9, 2010), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/04/09/rule-11-sanctions-exceptional-case-bad-day-for-
patent-troll/id=10065/; Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 706 F.Supp. 2d 713, (N.D. Tex. 2010) (It 
should be noted, however, that on appeal, Rule 11 sanctions were found not to be warranted, see Highmark, Inc. v. 
Allcare Health Mgmt. Inc., 732 F.Supp. 2d 653 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2010)). 
24 See Quinn, supra note 18. 
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in fact, have a strong, legally enforceable claim. 25  Ultimately, this increases the cost of claims 
and litigation for the troll and makes questionable ‗intimidation‘ claims less attractive.26  
 Licensing arrangements between trolls and entities that want use of the patent in question 
is one way to avoid the complexities and expense of litigation.27  While licensing agreements 
may be viewed favorably by both sides due to the fact that potential litigation is avoided on a 
particular patent or infringement issue, it has been pointed out that in some instances, fees 
obtained by troll entities through licensing agreements create a steady cash inflow that enable 
trolls to pursue litigation on other claims. 28  This ultimately does not cause a decrease in the 
amount of litigation in the system and actually provides funding to the perpetuation of highly 
contentious legal action.  Many argue that the bottom line argument against patent trolling is that 
by creating such a fear of legal action and penalty, trolling NPEs are creating a disincentive to 
innovate and are stifling research and development.29   
In addition to simply creating a fear of lawsuits, the added costs and time required to 
research existing patents creates an additional burden to legitimate innovators that may 
ultimately deter them from producing.30  When faced with a number of unsavory options created 
by opportunistically navigating the complexities of the current patent system, entities may 
choose simply not to innovate, produce or manufacture contrary to the original purpose of the 
system.  Importantly, this disconnect has been garnering the attention of lawmakers and 
increasingly the judicial system, as will be discussed below in part III. 
                                                        
25 Matthew D. Thayne, Taming the Patent Trolls: Tactics for Dealing with a Growing Epidemic, STOEL RIVES LLP 
(June 9, 2008), http://www.stoel.com/showarticle.aspx?Show=2973. 
26 Id. 
27 Daniel McFeely, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to 
Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289, 297 (2008). 
28 Id. 
29 Rajkumar Vaikhari, The Effect of Patent Trolls on Litigation: A Multi-Jurisdictional Approach, 1 INDIAN J. OF 
INTELL. PROP. L. 64, 67 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1320553&rec=1&srcabs=1314374. 
30 Id. 
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b. NPEs Are Simply Enforcing Their Legal Rights 
 
Despite the arguments against the opportunistic nature of so-called patent trolls, some 
argue that NPEs are simply enforcing their legal rights.31  In addition to Article 1, § 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, Title 35 of U.S. federal law provides statutory mandates on the USPTO in the 
granting of patents, protection of patent rights and patent cooperation.32  Under Title 35, patent 
holders are granted the right to ―exclude others from… using…the invention‖ for a term 
―beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which 
the application…was filed.‖33  In other words, patent holders are permitted the exclusive legal 
right to use their material.  For some, this is where the argument ends because technically, patent 
enforcement by NPEs is legal.34   
In addition to the legality aspect, there exist other arguments as to why the activities of 
NPEs should not be subject to such harsh criticism.  As mentioned above, the term patent troll 
can be used in a context that describes non-practicing entities that are engaged in legitimate 
activities, such as universities and small start-up research firms that are innovating, yet simply 
are choosing to not yet practice patented material due to funding reasons or the need for 
additional research and development.35  Additionally, whether or not a patent is being practiced 
is irrelevant to the illegality of infringement.36  As current patent laws stand, entities pursuing 
                                                        
31 Lueck, supra note 6. 
32 Patents, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006). 
33 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), (a)(2) (2006). 
34 Lueck, supra note 6. 
35 Id. 
36 Though it should be noted that some have called for this to be changed.  See McFeeley, supra note 21, at 310-12. 
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legal action based on infringement are completely within their rights as a patent owner, 
regardless of how they choose to use their patent rights.37  
Legitimate activities that often involve the non-use of patents include universities and 
other large research institutions.  These entities often purchase patents that end up being used for 
the purpose of long-term research rather than any type of immediate production or 
development.38  Additionally, universities typically are not, nor are they primarily intended to be, 
product-manufacturing entities.39  If broad measures such as an affirmative defense for failure to 
practice a patent were put into place, many legitimate NPEs would likely be directly adversely 
affected.  Though such measures would be based in an effort to help disable the activities of 
trolls, there would be many instances in which small entities and start-up firms would be 
penalized for being unable (financially or otherwise) or unwilling (for a myriad of reasons) to 
actively ―practice‖ their patents.  While this system could possibly help to disable the effective 
business model of the patent troll, consequences would be the resulting creation of large barriers 
for research entities and small, asset-lean firms.  This type of change would, in effect, be 
exchanging the stifling of innovation by trolls through litigation for the stifling of innovation by 
law through enhanced barriers for researchers and innovators and the superfluous policing of the 




                                                        
37 Lueck, supra note 6. Though non-use of patent rights is not the subject of this note, some have called for the 
creation of an affirmative defense for failure to practice as a possible solution to the patent troll problem (though it 
merits mention that this is not the current state of the law and as such, the remainder of the note will discuss patent 
law as it presently stands).  McFeeley, supra note 27, at 310-12. 
38 Lueck, supra note 6. 
39 Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L J. 611, 615 
(2008). 
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II. Creation of a Secondary Commodities Market vs. Litigation-Based Business Model 
 
 
 Despite arguments against the activities of entities that neither practice their patents nor 
actively participate in any innovation, there is an economic theory that supports the activities of 
NPEs.  Whether viewed as beneficial to small companies or harmful to innovation, the activities 
of NPEs may be examined from two points of view:  (1) these activities have resulted in the 
creation of a secondary commodities market that provides opportunity for small entities with 
limited financial resources or (2) these entities have acted opportunistically to the detriment of 
innovation in creating a litigation-based business model that strives only to profit from legal 
action based on unused patents and provides no benefit to the market or society as a whole.   
Acacia Research, known to many in the industry as a patent troll, states its business 
activities as gaining capital from its investors to ―acquire, develop and enforce patented 
technologies.‖40  These patented technologies‘ ―operating subsidies generate license fee revenues 
and related cash flows from the granting of licenses for the use of patented technologies.‖41 
While this may be viewed as legitimate business activity and not unlike the activities of 
intermediaries in a number of different industries,42 the monopolistic ownership of ideas related 
to exclusive patent rights distinguishes patent-based business models.43  One key distinction that 
needs to be made is whether the business model is made for the facilitation, service and 
corresponding profit through the use of innovation, development and manufacturing; or made for 
                                                        





42 For example, activities can loosely be likened to those of wholesalers in a business context as well as car dealers, 
stockbrokers and real estate agents. 
43 Patent Trolls and Patent Enforcement Rights, PATENTS R US, http://www.patentsr.us/articles/patent-trolls-patent-
enforcement.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
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facilitation, service and profit through litigation (or using Acacia‘s language, ―enforcement‖).  
The latter is what many opponents of non-practicing entities view as the problem.  The right and 
ability to prohibit others from using patented ideas, technologies and techniques to serve the 
public good and profit from such enforcement are certainly contrary to the Constitution‘s aim to 
―promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.‖44 
 Despite widespread criticism of the practice, with some characterizing the patent troll 
business model as ―a simple and effective source of illegitimate profit irrespective of the quality 
of the patent,‖ the patent troll business model focused on litigation is a business that is alive and 
well.45  According to a 2010 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) study, ―damage awards for NPEs 
have averaged more than triple those for practicing entities since 2001.‖46  This serves as 
evidence that those regularly pursuing patent litigation are becoming increasingly sophisticated 
at their art and this disparity between NPEs and practicing entities is continuing to grow.  The 
same PwC study found that between 1995 and 2001, median damage awards granted to NPEs 
versus practicing entities were $5.2 million to $6.3 million, respectively, and this disparity grew 
between 2002 and 2009 as the median NPE damage award rose to $12.9 million while the 
median award for practicing entities fell to $3.9 million.47  These types of statistics often gain 
attention and provide strong support to the widespread call for a solution to the patent troll 
problem.   
 What about those entities involved in helping facilitate innovation for small start-up 
companies?  In terms of non-practicing entities overall, a secondary licensing market helps 
facilitate business and innovation capabilities to small or specialized operations that do not have 
                                                        
44 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
45 Patent Quality Improvement Hearing, supra note 22, at 53. 
46 2010 Patent Litigation Study: The Continued Evolution of Patent Damages Law, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS 
available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2010-patent-litigation-study.pdf, at 5. 
47 Id. 
 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL‘Y, Vol. 12, No. 4, Fall 2011 
 
12 
the resources, expertise or need for exclusive patent ownership.  Likening the practice of a patent 
market intermediary to that of a securities dealer supplying capital markets, it has been argued 
that patent market intermediaries facilitate efficiency by increasing patent liquidity.48   
For small businesses or individual inventors that may not have the capital to fully develop 
their products, the ability to patent an idea and license it out frees up capital so the small entity 
may continue its work while society as a whole benefits from the innovation.  Under this idea, it 
has even been proposed that the term ‗patent dealer‘ be coined when referring to non-practicing 
patent owners engaged in licensing.49  Ideally, under a system of patent dealers businesses would 
be able to make better use of limited resources and focus on specializations and their 
comparative advantage, whether it lies in ideas and innovation or development and production.  
Evaluated in terms of basic economics, a system that allows for and eases the facilitation of 
licensing agreements encourages businesses to specialize which results in an advantage to 
society.50   
Issues arise in finding the delicate balance between curbing the abilities of those taking 
advantage of a secondary commodities market through litigation and promoting the activities of 
those who use the secondary commodities market as a tool to assist in innovation development.  
However, if regulations were imposed seeking to control opportunistic usage of patent markets, 
these changes may be unwittingly detrimental to small companies (as many fear will be the result 
of recent patent reform).51  There are a number of valid concerns raised on both sides of the NPE 
                                                        
48 James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in 
an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 216 (2006). 
49 Id. at 201. 
50 Comparative Advantage, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/Details/comparativeadvantage.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). 
51 Deborah Sweeney, New Patent Law and its Impact on Small Businesses, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 26, 2011), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/new-patent-law-and-its-impact-on-small-businesses-2011-9.  As an example, many 
feel that the recent changes to a first to file system is detrimental to small, independent inventors or innovators who 
are unable to quickly or immediately file a patent application due to limited time and assets.  Brett Trout, Senate 
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debate and it is often argued that sweeping legislative reform in an effort to combat the patent 
troll issue may result in dangerous unintended consequences for small companies and research 
institutions in their activities as NPEs.52  
 
III. Judicial Decisions Changing Patent Law 
 
Recognizing increasing frustrations with the patent system as a whole, the judicial system 
has begun to hear more patent cases in an attempt to settle issues that are having a large impact 
on the system.  Due to the nature and quick evolution of intellectual property and technology, 
there are an ever-increasing number of issues and correspondingly, cases being decided to 
answer the growing number of questions facing patent litigation.  This section contains examples 
of recent judicial decisions that may, collectively, have a substantial impact on the practice of 
trolls and their ability to operate as effectively as they have in the past.  By narrowly addressing 
issues presented by specific instances, this judicial authority is slowly chipping away at the 
power of patent trolls with arguably less adverse impact on legitimate non-practicing entities 
than widespread patent reform. 
 
a. MedImmune v. Genetech 
 
 In MedImmune v. Genetech, patent validity was the focus.53  The question to be decided 
by the Supreme Court was whether the Declaratory Judgment Act ―requires a patent licensee to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Passes Bill Favoring Corporations Over Inventors, BLAWGIT (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://blawgit.com/2011/03/10/senate-passes-bill-favoring-corporations-over-inventors/.   
52 Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, Elves or Trolls?  The Role of Non-Practicing Patent 
Owners in the Innovation Economy, TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2008-018 (2008) at 22, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1136086. 
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terminate or be in breach of its license agreement before it can seek a declaratory judgment that 
the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.‖54  More simply, the issue was 
whether a licensee, in choosing not to pay license fees on a patent it feels is invalid, must first 
breach its contract by not paying the fees while seeking a declaratory judgment on patent 
validity.  A problem arose because by ceasing to pay licensing fees, the licensee (MedImmune) 
was making itself vulnerable to breach of contract suits by the licensor (Genetech).  In this case, 
MedImmune felt that it was under no obligation under a license agreement with Genetech to pay 
royalties on a patent that MedImmune believed to be invalid.55  The Supreme Court reasoned that 
MedImmune should not have to bear the risk of possible legal action and resulting financial harm 
in order to assert its rights (their beliefs and claim that the patent was valid).56  This decision 
provides a great advantage to licensees, as they are now able to challenge the validity of a patent 
without exposing themselves to the liability of breach of contract claims.57 
 The MedImmune decision has received praise accompanied by an increase in licensee‘s 
rights but is also faced with criticism.  With the ruling, the underlying certainty of patent 
ownership and licensing agreements has been called into question.58  By creating an avenue of 
uncertainty related to licensing agreements, it is quite possible that the efficiency and 
attractiveness of such arrangements will be somewhat decreased.  Some argue that this 
uncertainty may result in the creation of a barrier to an efficient system of technology transfer, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
53 Medimmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).  Patent validity is often an issue raised by defendants 
and will be further explored infra in Part III (d).  
54 Id. at 120-21. 
55 Id. at 124.  
56 Id. 
57 Dennis Fernandez & Brian J. Bensch, The Impact of MedImmune v. Genetech, IPFRONTLINE (May 22, 2007), 
http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.aspx?id=15101&deptid=3. 
58 Id. 
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thus increasing transaction costs.59  It has also been argued that this inefficiency may result in 
increased fees for drafting and negotiating licenses as well as increased likelihood of litigation.60  
Though Justice Thomas dissented in MedImmune, stating: ―By holding that contractual 
obligations are sufficiently coercive to allow a party to bring a declaratory judgment action, the 
majority has given every patent licensee a cause of action and a free pass,‖ and that the decision 
―contains no limiting principle whatsoever,‖ the Court decision was an 8-1 majority.61 
The fact that licensors (typically in a troll scenario, the NPE) are now faced with an 
additional level of danger will likely have some impact on the practice of NPEs.  The result of 
the decision is that licensors now have less leverage due to the fact that they are unable to rely on 
a breach of contract claim as a counter-attack to a question of patent validity.62  By increasing the 
possibility of legal action and raising the overall cost of licensing agreements for both parties, the 
business of licensing agreements becomes a bit more risky and overall less economically 
attractive. 
b. eBay v. MercExchange 
 
Perhaps an even more significant development in creating barriers to the activities of 
trolls is the 2006 Supreme Court decision of eBay v. MercExchange.63  In eBay, the question to 
be answered was: Under the Patent Act, should a permanent injunction always be issued when a 
patent has been violated, absent exceptional circumstances?64  The Court decided unanimously 
                                                        
59 Peter Jay, Removing Incentives for Technology Transfer: Medimmune v. Genetech, 5 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69, 
81 (2007). 
60 Id. at 82. 
61 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 146 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
62 Jennifer L. Collins & Michael A. Cicero, The Impact of MedImmune Upon Both Licensing and Litigation, 89 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 748, 751 (2007). 
63 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, Inc., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
64 eBay v. MercExchange, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2005/2005_05_130 (last visited Jan. 26, 
2011). 
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that no, a permanent injunction should not always be issued but instead, the plaintiff seeking the 
injunction must satisfy a four-part test.65  In order to be granted a permanent injunction, a 
plaintiff now must prove that ―(1) it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law…are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance 
of hardships between the plaintiff and the defendant, a remedy in equity is not warranted; and (4) 
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.‖66  In eliminating the 
automatic injunction, the Court closely examined the language of the Patent Act, noting that the 
language provides that injunctions ―may‖ be issued.67 
 This decision affects the ability of NPEs to operate efficiently, and in his concurrence 
Justice Kennedy explicitly touched on the existence of such entities: ―An industry has developed 
in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily 
for obtaining licensing fees… For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions 
arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to 
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.‖68  Justice Kennedy, identifying the 
business model of patent ownership and licensing agreements concluded that when ―the threat of 
an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be 
sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public 
interest.‖69   
Justice Kennedy‘s observation has quite possibly the largest limiting effect on the ability 
of patent trolls and NPEs using their patents opportunistically by declaring that in many of these 
instances, injunctions are not only necessary, but harm the public interest.  With those few 
                                                        
65 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 392. 
68 Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
69 Id. 
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sentences, Justice Kennedy was able to remove some of the leverage from which patent trolls 
have, historically, received benefit.  This distinction of harming the public interest is important 
because it allows for judicial discretion to help distinguish between what entity may be classified 
as a troll and what may be classified as a legitimate, innovative NPE.  The concurrence of Justice 
Kennedy has been cited in additional cases to identify situations where the patent holder was 
operating in a profit-seeking manner as an NPE.70  Judging those NPEs that hinder the public 
interest with increasing harshness, a district court case from the Eastern District of Texas has 
gone so far as to effectively destroy the NPE‘s right to exclude others from using the patented 
material.71 
 Though the call for patent reform has been widespread, Justice Kennedy points out the 
direction that the patent system seems to be moving as of recent:  
―The equitable discretion over injunctions, granted by the Patent Act, is well 
suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid technological and legal developments 
in the patent system.  For these reasons, it should be recognized that district courts 
must determine whether past practice fits the circumstances of the cases before 
them.‖72  
 
Here, Justice Kennedy‘s statements seem to identify the fact that judicial remedies are an 
effective means to create change due to the ever-developing nature of technology and patent 
issues.  Given the boilerplate application of Congressional action, judicial remedies seem to be 
particularly well suited to the intricacies of non-practicing entity issues.  Being able to weigh the 
                                                        
70 z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F.Supp. 2d 437, 441 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor 
Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006); Miranda Jones, Permanent 
Injunction, A Remedy By Any Other Name is Patently Not The Same: How eBay v. MercExchange Affects the Patent 
Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2007). 
71 Finisar Corp v. DIRECTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 WL 2709206 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2006) (Though 
parts of this decision were overturned on appeal, the initial verdict may be used to illustrate increasing harshness 
against an entity that does not practice its patent); Yixin H. Tang, The Future of Patent Enforcement After eBay v. 
MercExchange, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH, 235, 249 (2006). 
72 eBay, 547 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL‘Y, Vol. 12, No. 4, Fall 2011 
 
18 
importance of factors such as benefits to the public interest, judicial decisions are increasingly 
attempting to remedy problems presented by the current patent system. 
 Despite the benefits, the eBay decision is not without controversy.  Since the Supreme 
Court did not offer any guidance as to how to apply the four-factor test, it has been noted that 
district courts may apply the test differently resulting in incongruent decisions by district.73  It is 
also suggested that this issue may lead patent trolls to forum shop for districts that have applied 
the four-factor test in a way that is more favorable to an entity that does not practice its patents.74  
Additionally, it has been noted that since injunctions have been applied inconsistently in 
different district courts and alternative remedies have attempted and failed, ultimately patent 
trolls will just simply adjust the way they run their businesses.75   Even with criticisms, the eBay 
decision marks a milestone in the leveraging power between a potential opportunistic troll and a 
legitimate business and provides an additional defense to the legitimate business in its fight 
against injunctions. 
 
c. Uniloc v. Microsoft 
 
 The recent decision of Uniloc v. Microsoft further chips away at the power and 
attractiveness of patent trolling activities by significantly changing the way will damages be 
determined.76  Courts have used a generally accepted twenty-five percent standard to 
approximate ―the reasonable royalty rate that the manufacturer of the patented product would be 
                                                        
73 Damian Myers, Reeling in the Patent Troll: Was ebay v. MerExchange Enough?, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 333, 348 
(2007). 
74 Id. at 348, 351. 
75 Leslie T. Grab, Equitable Concerns of eBay v. MercExchange: Did the Supreme Court Successfully Balance 
Patent Protection Against Patent Trolls?, 8 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 81, 103-105, 109 (2006). 
76 Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied (Mar. 22, 2011).  
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willing to offer to pay to the patentee during a hypothetical negotiation.‖77  This figure is reached 
by dividing expected profits by expected net sales, resulting in a profit rate that is then multiplied 
by twenty-five percent to reach a baseline royalty rate.78  However, it is noted that this rule ―fails 
to account for the unique relationship between the patent and the accused product‖ resulting in a 
baseline royalty rate that does not accurately reflect the results of a hypothetical negotiation 
between the parties.79  Thus, the court decided that the twenty-five percent general rule was a 
―fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate‖ which had been perpetuated 
simply because of its widespread acceptance.80  With this reasoning, it was determined that 
evidence relying on the use of the twenty-five percent general rule be considered inadmissible.81  
In its explanation, the court described the twenty-five percent rule as ―arbitrary‖ and that such a 
rule is deemed to ―taint the jury‘s damages calculation.‖82  Now, rather than being able to rely 
upon a generous, essentially automatic twenty-five percent damage calculation, NPEs may be 
more weary of the fact that ―conclusions made correspond to the facts of the case, and that the 
evidentiary burdens are met.‖83   
Today, instead of relying on an industry-accepted twenty-five percent rule of thumb, the 
patentee must establish a basis using factual analysis and fair market value.84  Parties involved 
have stated that the decision is a ―strong validation of the value of the patent‖ and that it ―is an 
important and helpful opinion with respect to the law of damages and it may signal the end to 
                                                        
77 Id. at 1312.   
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1313. 
80 Id. at 1315. 
81 Id.  
82 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318. 
83 Jason Miller, Patent Litigants—25% Rule is Dead!, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Jan. 11, 2011),  available at 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/patent-litigants-25-rule-dead. 
84 Adrian Lurrsen, Uniloc v. Microsoft: What Lawyers are Saying, JDSUPRA (Jan. 20, 2011), 
http://scoop.jdsupra.com/2011/01/articles/legal-research/uniloc-v-microsoft-what-lawyers-are-saying/. 
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unreasonable and outsized damages awards based on faulty methodology.‖85  This decision 
should cause patent trolls to be somewhat cautious.  It places an additional hurdle in an attempt 
to gain high licensing fees that will be protected by the courts.  The court in Uniloc also 
expressed some respect and favor for the activities of the licensee: ―The licensee should retain a 
majority of the profits, because it has undertaken substantial development, operational and 
commercialization risks, contributed other technology/IP and/or brought to bear its own 
development, operational and commercialization contributions.‖86  This statement along with the 
ultimate decision in Uniloc further evidences the court‘s preference for giving the benefit to the 
entity that actually ‗practices‘ the patent, and rightly so if one bases an opinion on the traditional 
foundations of the U.S. patent system.  Numerous elements of Uniloc weigh in favor of the 
active user of the patent, which raises concern and presents additional hazards to the practice of 
trolling.  Rather than imposing complex legislation, the Uniloc decision simply chips away at the 
attractiveness and financial benefits of trolling by restoring ideas of equity that support the 
innovator and promote the ‗useful arts‘ protected by the Constitution. 
 
d. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership 
 
 The Supreme Court recently heard the case of Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership to 
determine what standard of proof should be used to challenge a patent‘s validity, either clear and 
                                                        
85 Susan Decker, Microsoft Loses Court Ruling in Uniloc Patent Case, BLOOMBERG, (Jan. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-04/microsoft-loses-appeal-in-388-million-uniloc-verdict-update1-.html. 
86 Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Robert Goldscheider, John Jarosz & Carla Mulhern, Use of the 25 Per Cent 
Rule in Valuing IP, 37 les Nouvelles 123, 124 (Dec. 2002), available at 
http://www.bu.edu/otd/files/2009/11/goldscheider-25-percent-rule.pdf). 
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convincing evidence or some lesser standard.87  It was the contention of Microsoft that the 
standard of proof should be lowered from clear and convincing to a less demanding standard 
when there is additional evidence (referred to as ‗prior art‘) not considered by the USPTO in 
initially granting the patent.88  Section 282 of Title 35 of the U.S. Code requires that ―the burden 
of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such 
invalidity,‖ but this section does not establish the standard of proof to satisfy the evidentiary 
burden.89   
 Microsoft argued since the statute is silent on the evidentiary burden, an applicable 
standard should be based on a preponderance of evidence (citing the decision of Grogan v. 
Garner).90  Grogan stated that: ―silence is inconsistent with the view that Congress intended to 
require a special, heightened standard of proof.‖91  i4i‘s contention that there should be a very 
high burden to prove invalidity was supported by the 1934 Supreme Court case Radio Corp. v. 
Radio Engineering Labs., Inc.
92  There, the Court held that there is a presumption of patent 
validity that may not be ―overthrown except by clear and convincing evidence.‖93  The Radio 
Corp. opinion considers the preponderance of evidence standard but ultimately describes it as 
―dubious‖.94  This issue is further complicated by the fact that prior to the creation of the federal 
                                                        
87 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P‘ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 180 L. Ed. 131 (2011); Microsoft v. i4i Limited Partnership, 
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/microsoft-v-i4i-limited-partnership/ (last visited Feb. 
24, 2011). 
88 Greg Stohr, Microsoft Gets U.S. Supreme Court Hearing in i4i Case Over Word Software, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 
2010), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-29/microsoft-gets-u-s-supreme-court-hearing-in-case-
against-i4i-of-toronto.html. 
89 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2011). 
90 498 U.S. 279 (1991). 
91 Id. at 286. 
92 293 U.S. 1 (1934). 
93 Id. at 2.  
94 Id. at 8 (―an infringer who assails the validity of a patent fair upon its face bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and 
fails unless his evidence has more than a dubious preponderance‖). 
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circuit court system in 1982, the courts were split on their interpretation of the issue and a 
presumption of validity was not uniform throughout the system.95   
 If the Court sided with the arguments of Microsoft, the result would have been a fairly 
complicated and confusing application of different standards of proof for prior art considered by 
the USPTO (requiring clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of validity) and 
new evidence of prior art not considered by the USPTO (requiring a only preponderance of 
evidence standard to rebut presumption of validity).96  Despite the complexity of a pro-Microsoft 
decision, Microsoft‘s claims were supported by several amici, arguing for the lower 
‗preponderance‘ evidentiary standard when prior art in question was not examined, for the reason 
that there should not be deference to a decision based on lack of knowledge or awareness.97  
Offering additional support for the presented arguments, Microsoft‘s petition for certiorari 
attacked the adequacy of the patent system by noting the recent surge of patent implications and 
strain on the system as well as citing ―significant information asymmetries‖ leading to ―an 
increasingly large number of mistakes, some of them glaring.‖98   
 However, i4i‘s argument against changing the evidentiary standard was focused primarily 
on preserving benefit to the public interest and stated that a ―heightened burden benefits the 
public by increasing inventors‘ incentive to commit the resources required for innovation and 
then to disclose their innovations.‖99  Additionally, it was i4i‘s contention that ―robust protection 
                                                        
95 Firm Publication: Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP (Dec. 15, 2010), 
http://www.lw.com/Resources.aspx?page=FirmPublicationDetail&publication=3853. 
96 Gene Quinn, Supreme Court to Hear Microsoft v. i4i Argument April 18, 2011, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 13, 2011), 
http://ipwatchdog.com/2011/02/13/supreme-court-microsoft-i4i-april-18-argument/id=15298/.  
97 Clement S. Roberts, Microsoft v. i4i: Amici Make Strong Argument for Supreme Court Review of Patent Invalidity 
Standard, PATENT LAW PRACTICE CENTER (Oct. 5, 2010), http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2010/10/05/microsoft-v-i4i-
amici-make-strong-argument-for-supreme-court-review-of-patent-invalidity-standard/. 
98  Brief of Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P‘Ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290), 2010 WL 3413088 at 
*19-20. 
99 Brief in Opposition, Microsoft Corp. v. I4i Ltd. P‘Ship, 131, S.Ct. 647 (2010) (No. 10-290), 2010 WL 4314336 at 
*3. 
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against erroneous invalidation of patents recognizes and protects the enormous resources that go 
into the innovation process, and gives inventors a strong incentive to invest those resources and 
then disclose their innovations.‖100  By stating that ―adopting a lower standard of proof for any 
piece of prior art not specifically cited by the PTO would further burden already-overtaxed 
patent examiners,‖ i4i presented the parade of horribles related to the issue of examination and 
questioning related to potentially irrelevant prior art, resulting in ―a more expensive application 
process (a particular onus for individuals and other small innovators) and a sharp increase in 
application processing time.‖101  Again focusing on the basis of the patent system, i4i stated: 
―Microsoft‘s argument ignored the public benefit provided by the clear-and-convincing 
standard,‖ a standard which ―gives inventors a greater incentive to engage in innovation . . . 
allowing the public to enjoy the fruits of those inventions.‖102   
  Although both sides presented legitimate arguments on points of law, the Court was tasked 
with both staying in line with recent decisions and developments and being mindful of the 
broader responsibility of the providing protection for public interest related to patents.103  On 
June 9, 2011, the Supreme Court unanimously sided with i4i, deciding that an invalidity defense 
would have to be proven by clear and convincing evidence.104  Justice Sotomayor noted that 
applying Microsoft‘s proposed variable standard of proof would be ―unusual and impractical‖ 
                                                        
100 Id. at *18. 
101 Id. at *22. 
102 Id. at *26. 
103 It is interesting to note the effect that previously discussed cases will have on future cases dealing with patent 
issues.  Uniloc v. Microsoft actually cites to the initial i4i v. Microsoft case and its use of the 25 percent rule.  In 
Uniloc, the court states that ―[c]ourts have invariably admitted evidence based on the 25% rule, largely in reliance 
on its widespread acceptance‖ and goes on to quote the initial i4i decision, stating: ―[i4i‘s expert] testified that it was 
customary within his field to apply a ‗25% rule of thumb‘… Thus, considering the foundation laid by [i4i‘s expert‘s] 
testimony, his application of the 25% rule was relevant and appropriately considered‖. Based on Uniloc‘s decision, 
it is now possible that when other courts are faced with a similar issue regarding the determination of appropriate 
royalty rates, this recent Fifth Circuit decision for will provide guidance. 
104 Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2240. 
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and stated that an ―examiner is under no duty to cite every reference he considers.‖105  Though 
the decision noted that new evidence of prior unexamined art perhaps should carry more weight 
than previously examined art, new evidence is simply not strong enough to change the burden of 
proof for invalidity.106 
Some feel the Court‘s decision in favor of i4i is a small victory for patent trolls, as a 
lowered evidentiary standard would have created encouragement as well as eased the process of 
challenging patents of questionable validity.107  Thus, to a certain extent, patents currently held 
by trolling NPEs have maintained the previous level of protection.108  However, it is important to 
keep in mind that by lowering the evidentiary standard to preponderance of evidence, the value 
and certainty associated with patent ownership would have been diminished by making 
determinations of patent invalidity easier to obtain for all patents, those owned by both trolls and 
legitimate practicing entities and innovators.109  One benefit obtained by defendants as a result of 
the Microsoft decision is that juries are now able to be made explicitly aware they are 
considering evidence that ―the PTO had no opportunity to evaluate before granting the patent‖ 
and to ―evaluate whether the evidence before it is materially new, and if so, to consider that fact 
when determining whether an invalidity defense has been proved by clear and convincing 
evidence.‖110  
                                                        
105 Id. at 2250, 2250 n.10. 
106 Id. at 2250. 
107 Patent Validity: Supreme Court Maintains Status Quo, NOLO (June 10, 2011), http://www.nolo.com/legal-
update/patent-invalidity-supreme-court-microsoft-46937.html; Nancy Gohring, Supreme Court Ruling Seen as a 
Win for Patent Trolls, PCWORLD (June 9, 2011), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/229968/supreme_court_ruling_seen_as_a_win_for_patent_trolls.html. 
108 Id. 
109 Microsoft v. i4i—Awaiting a Burdensome Decision by the Supreme Court, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE (May 17, 
2011, 3:12 pm),  http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2011/05/17/microsoft-v-i4i-–-awaiting-a-burdensome-decision-by-
the-supreme-court/. 
110 Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2251. 
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  With this decision, the Court had the ability to explicitly take into account the 
implications on small innovators and legitimate NPEs, however this issue was largely avoided 
with a few small exceptions focused on the foundational basis of the patent system.111  The broad 
issue of difficulties faced by the present patent system was avoided and even deferred to 
legislators as it was succinctly stated that over time, ―Congress has amended the patent laws to 
account for concerns about ‗bad‘ patents, including by expanding the reexamination process.‖112  
However, Justice Breyer acknowledged the Court‘s responsibility is to preserve the original 
goals of the patent system noting, ―By preventing the ―clear and convincing‖ standard from 
roaming outside its fact-related reservation, courts can increase the likelihood that discoveries or 
inventions will not receive legal protection where none is due.‖113 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas supported the Court‘s decision but clearly 
remained somewhat skeptical that Congress intended such a clear, codified standard of proof. 114   
This may suggest that members of the Court may be willing to review holes and ambiguities in 
the patent system in the future.  Although ultimately the Supreme Court did not fully take 
advantage of the opportunity to speak to the potential differences of patent validity between 
trolling entities and legitimate non-practicing entities that foster technological innovation, the 
decision is a small step in the right direction and the fact that the Court generally recognized the 




                                                        
111 Mark Hachman, Supreme Court to Hear Microsoft, i4i Dispute, PCMAG.COM (Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2373620,00.asp. 
112 Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2252. 
113 Id. at 2253 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
114 Id. at 2253-54 (Thomas, J., concurring). 





 The patent law system continually faces novel and difficult questions due to the ever-
increasing sophistication of technological advancement and invention.  Recognizing the 
opportunity for profit, non-practicing entities have entered the patent ―market‖ in an attempt to 
gain financial benefit through litigation and licensing agreements, though these actions are often 
contrary to the foundational basis of the United States patent law system.  In an attempt to 
combat the stifling of innovation and after many years of debate and proposed reform, Congress 
passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in an effort to help reform the overburdened U.S. 
patent system.  However, many feel that the AIA did not do enough to fight the activities of 
opportunistic NPEs and some fear the legislative change may result in harmful, unintended 
consequences.   
Because of the close, careful tailoring additional patent reform would require, growing 
judicial interest and activity in the area of patent law currently seems to be an effective means to 
address the troll problem.   Through specific limitations and burdens placed upon NPEs resulting 
from decisions based on real-life situations, problems occurring in practice are being addressed.  
Notably, the Supreme Court has increasingly been granting certiorari to a number of patent cases 
that have been resulting in important precedent and implications for the future of U.S. patent law.  
By using Supreme Court as well as federal district court decisions to set more clear standards 
regarding ambiguities and problems with the current patent system, companies are able to gain a 
clearer picture of the system in which they are working and loopholes traditionally used by NPEs 
acting as trolls are being filled.   
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As these decisions become engrained into regular patent practice, trolling entities will be 
faced with additional barriers which, admittedly, may result in increased sophistication of some 
entities, but may also cause a number of entities to decide that the ever-increasing costs and ever-
decreasing returns from litigation make the business no longer financially attractive.  The 
guidance provided by the judicial system will be most effective if it continues takes into account 
the circumstances of the particular entities and remains loyal to the basis of the U.S. patent 
system: innovation.  By ruling in favor of entities that foster innovation, development and 
production, patents will have the ability to maintain value as tools of development.  
